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Over the past two decades, school shootings within the United States have repeatedly devastated
communities and shaken public opinion. Many of these attacks appear to be ‘lone wolf’ ones driven
by specific individual motivations, and the identification of precursor signals and hence actionable
policy measures would thus seem highly unlikely. Here, we take a system-wide view and investigate
the timing of school attacks and the dynamical feedback with social media. We identify a trend
divergence in which college attacks have continued to accelerate over the last 25 years while those
carried out on K-12 schools have slowed down. We establish the copycat effect in school shootings
and uncover a statistical association between social media chatter and the probability of an attack in
the following days. While hinting at causality, this relationship may also help mitigate the frequency
and intensity of future attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Extensive research has been carried out on individual
mass shooting case studies, yielding a complex variety of
causes revolving around individual-centric factors such
as mental illness, social rejection and harassment [1–4]
(see [5] and [6] for reviews). A sociological model to
understand and prevent attacks has been proposed [7]
and several solutions have been presented, including com-
munity cohesion [1] and early-signals detection [8, 9].
Recent studies have analyzed the causes of school shoot-
ings at a larger scale, finding that school shootings can
impact new attacks [10], and that unemployment rates
are correlated with shooting rates [11]. Our work pro-
vides a significant advance on current understanding by
providing a collective level description beyond individual
case studies, accompanied by a rigorous mathematical
framework. We establish the copycat effect in school
shootings, providing evidence for the role that media
plays in the spread of school shootings [12]. These results
follow from our unified treatment of two complemen-
tary databases (see Methods), the first (Shultz) of which
includes fatals attacks from 1990–March 2018, while the
second (Everytown) includes all incidents from 2013–
March 2018, irrespective of whether there were casual-
ties. Furthermore, we include a database of mass killings
(collected by USA Today), covering attacks causing more
than four casualties from 2006–July 2015, showing that
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the results are not exclusive of school shootings, but con-
sistent across high-profile types of violence.
DATA CHARACTERIZATION
Many human activities have been shown to give rise to
heavy-tail distributions in the magnitude of the associ-
ated events and in the interevent times. Consistent with
other human activities, we found heavy-tail distributions
in the attack size (Fig. 1A) and the timing of attacks
(Fig. 1B) across the three databases studied. Despite
these data reflecting attacks with different characteris-
tics, all databases showed remarkable consistency in the
interattack distribution when normalized by the average
waiting time (Fig. 1B). Importantly, heavy-tail distribu-
tions in the timing of attacks show a deviation from a
random Poisson process, where the event rate is uniform
in time, and indicate the presence of underlying factors.
The deviation from Poisson processes in complex sys-
tems has been associated with burstiness [13], where
events cluster together in time (Figs. S1A–D). Cluster-
ing can emerge from two mechanisms [13]. Firstly, it is
related to the distribution of interevent times and can be
characterized by the normalized coefficient of variance
B = (στ/τ¯)−1(στ/τ¯)+1 . B ranges between −1 for highly regu-
lar processes to 0 for Poisson processes and 1 for heavy-
tail distributions. Physiological complex systems such as
hearbeats are highly regular, while natural and human
activities usually exhibit large burstiness values [13].
Interestingly, the distribution of time events is only mod-
erately skewed, with B = 0.142, 0.069 and − 0.02 for the
Shultz, Everytown and USA Today databases. These val-
ues contrast with the burstiness for other human activ-
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FIG. 1. Escalation patterns in school shootings. (A) Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) for
event severity (dots and solid line) and best fit (dashed line) to power-law distribution. Note that the USA Today database
only includes attacks with four or more victims. (B) CCDF for normalized interevent times (dots and solid line). Inset show
the CCDF of the raw intereven times. (C) Probability of attack depending on the presence of an attack in the previous seven
days. Each bin contains one sixth of the attacks. (D-F) The escalation plot, log10 n vs. log10 τn, for (D) All, (E) K-12 and
(F) College attacks using the Schulz database (Methods). LOWESS fit (δ = 0, α = 0.66) is shown in dark gray, with the years
where the trend changes annotated.
ities such as emailing, library loans, printing and calls,
that range between 0.2 and 0.65. The second mecha-
nism affecting clustering is the memory of the system.
While natural activities exhibit memory (e.g., large repli-
cas follow large earthquakes), human activities have low
to no memory [13]. We measured the memory of the
system using autocorrelation, which ranges between −1
for disassortative process—i.e., large (small) interevent
times follow small (large) interevent times, 0 for no cor-
relation and 1 for assortative processes. In contrast to
other human activities, we found memory comparable to
natural phenomena for up to five attacks (Fig. S1A).
Importantly, the existance of memory is linked to a four-
fold increase in the probability of an attack in the days
following a school shooting (Fig. 1C). Given that the
clustering not only arises from a skewed distribution of
the interevent times, but also from memory, we hypothe-
size the existence of an external feedback loop increasing
the attack rate, that we later link to social media.
To further characterize the data, we analyzed the
interevent time distribution in detail. We apply locally
weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) to the log-
log plot of τn versus n (Fig. 1D–F), where the slope b
is an indicator of changes in the attack rate [14]. Figure
1D, containing all attacks, shows three regions in time:
From 1990 until 1993, the attack rate increased steadi-
ly (b > 0). From 1993 until 2003 there was a slowing
down in the attacks (b < 0), that was interrupted around
2004, when the escalation rate again became positive.
Although the specific value of b depends on the correct
determination of the first interevent time (τ0), the results
are robust to different values of τ0 (Fig. S2B–C). The
change in trend in 2004 shows that college attacks have
been accelerating (Fig. 1E), while K-12 attacks have con-
tinued slowing down (Fig. 1F). In the following sections
we describe and analyze the results of two models that
have been successfully applied to explain other forms of
conflict: the Hawkes process [15–17] and the dynamical
Red Queen or “Red versus Blue” model [14].
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FIG. 2. Hawkes process model: Distance and time terms of the kernel function. (A) Fraction of attacks within
a distance of each other for the Shultz and Everytown database and for the four null models, where the distribution of the
population (drawn with probabily equal to the underlying US population or drawn at random from any coordinate in the
United States) and the timing (equal to the observed time or drawn at random from a Poission distribution). The timing has
only an effect in the kernel functions (B–C). (B) Intensity of attacks with respect to distance between attacks. A line with slope
equal to 2 (i.e., the bare intensity decrease matching the increase in area) is shown for comparison. (C) Intensity of attacks
with respect to time between attacks.
MODELS
Hawkes process: The Hawkes process is a self-exciting
point process model described by
λ(x, t) = µ+
∑
i:ti≤t
g(x− xi, t− ti), (1)
where λ(x, t) is the attack rate at position x and time t,
µ is the background Poisson rate and g(x − xi, t − ti)
is the contribution of the attack i occurring at xi, ti.
Hawkes processes have been typically used to study
earthquakes [18]. In the case of seismicity, a triggered
earthquake is followed by aftershocks, which in turn acti-
vate new aftershocks creating a cascade of events. This
is modelled by separating earthquakes into background
and aftershocks, where background events occur with a
specific background rate and the probability of the after-
shocks depends on the time and distance from previous
earthquakes according to the kernel g(x, t). The kernel
can be explicitly defined [18] or calculated using non-
parametric methods [19]. The same modelling has also
recently been successfully applied to social phenomena,
such as finance [20], crime [21], terrorism in Irak [22]
and mass killings [10]. Here, we used the non-parametric
method from [19] to estimate the kernel g(x, t) and under-
stand the mechanism by which school shootings trigger
cascades of attacks.
Marsan and Lengline´’s method [19] uses an
expectation-maximization algorithm on the binned
events (earthquakes in their case). It iteratively decou-
ples the events into background and triggering events
using µ and g, and updates µ and g using the new
decoupling of events until convergence is obtained. The
original algorithm revealed a linear scaling between
the magnitude of the event and the probability of
an aftershock. However, this either does not apply
for school shootings or the difference is too small to
quantify given the sparsity of our data (Fig. S3A–B).
Therefore, we excluded the magnitude of the attack from
the study and calculate the relationship between the
probability of new attacks given the time and distance
since previous attacks. In order to put our results in
perspective, we created four null models where we varied
the distance and the timing between attacks. In the
first two models (I,II) the attacks were drawn at random
from US cities with probability proportional to their
population (using the Geonames database). In the last
two models (III,IV) the attacks were drawn at random
from any coordinate in the United States. Models I and
III use a timing between attacks equal to the (Schulz or
Everytown), whereas in models II and IV the attacks
occur as a Poisson process with λ equal to the mean
interevent time database (λShultz = τShultz = 39 days
and λEverytown = τEverytown = 6.5 days).
First, we analyze the the fraction of pairs of attacks
that are located within a specific distance of each oth-
er (Fig. 2). The distance between all attack pairs is
similar to that expected if the attacks were distribut-
ed proportional to the US population. Next, we ana-
lyzed the effect of time and distance in the spreading of
attacks. Figures 2B–C show the two components of the
kernel function g, the intensity decrease as a function of
the distance between attacks (Fig. 2B) and the decrease
4as a function of time between attacks (Fig. 2C). If the
attacks were uniformly distributed, the algorithm would
assign a low weight to the kernel function. However, we
obtained a consistent form of the kernel function for all
databases studied. Both the distance between attacks
and the time between attacks diminish the probability
of new attacks as an approximate power-law. Moreover,
although the consistency in distance can be explained by
the underlying distribution of population (Fig. 2B), the
consistency in timing cannot be explained by an underly-
ing Poisson process (Fig. 2C). Thus our results indicate
that while the attacks occur approximately at random
in space, with the exception of within-town attacks, the
attacks do affect the timing of new shootings, increas-
ing the rate of attacks by a 3-10 fold, especially in the
week following the attack. Our results are consistent with
those of Towers et al. [10], where the kernel of the Hawkes
process was explicitly modeled with a exponential decay
on time. While Towers et al. determined that an attack
had a half-life of 8.9 days ([3.7-36.9] days) in subsequent
attacks, we estimate it on 7.3 days ([5.2 - 11.3] days).
The Hawkes model confirms the presence of attack cas-
cades, and quantifies the effect of distance and time in
the probability of new attacks.
Red versus Blue model : Empirical and theoretical
studies have shown that the trend in timings and dis-
tribution of severities of attacks in human conflicts are
described by the power laws τn = τ1n
−b and p(s) ∝ sα
respectively, where τn is the time between attacks n and
n + 1, b is the escalation rate, s is the attack severi-
ty, and α ' 2.5 [14, 23]. Positive values of the escala-
tion rate b reflect an increase in the frequency of attacks
with time, while the attack rate decreases if b is negative.
An explanatory model emerges from consideration of the
confrontation dynamics between two opponents [23]. In
our case, the two ‘opponents’ are the pool of potential
attackers which we call Red, none of whom are necessar-
ily in contact with or know each other, and Society which
we call Blue. At any one instance, Red tends to hold a
collective advantage R over Blue in that Red is largely
an unknown threat group residing within Blue. The size
of this advantage depends on the number of potential
attackers and their resources. Each attack can affect the
balance between Red and Blue, for example by increas-
ing R [14, 23]. It is reasonable to assume that the main
changes in Red’s lead R over Blue occur just after a new
attack, e.g., due to media coverage. This is confirmed
empirically by the increased probability of a subsequent
attack (Fig. 1C), as well from the results of the Hawkes
model (Fig. 2C). If the changes in R are independent and
identically distributed, the Central Limit Theorem states
that the typical value of R after n attacks, R(n), will be
proportional to nb, where b = 0.5 [24]. For the more gen-
eral case where changes in R depend on the history of
previous changes, b will deviate from 0.5 corresponding
to ‘anomalous’ diffusion [25]. Taking the frequency of the
attacks to be proportional to Red’s advantage over Blue,
we obtain τn = τ1n
−b.
Our theory predicts that the time to the nth attack
is determined by the progress curve τn = τ1n
−b. The
progress curve assumes that the time to the next attack
is deterministic. However, in reality one can imagine that
a series of N background processes would need to ‘fall
into place’ before a potential attacker finds himself in an
operational position to carry out an attack and hence
provide the (n + 1)th attack. The triggering of each of
these N processes may independently fluctuate and so
delay or accelerate the next attack. Similar to multiplica-
tive degradation processes in engineering, we assume that
each of these steps multiplies the expected time interval
by a factor (1 + j) where the stochastic variables j ’s
mimic these exogenous factors. It is reasonable to assume
that the values of the j ’s are independent and identically
distributed, which means that their sum (i.e., the noise
term in the progress curve fit) is approximately Gaus-
sian distributed with zero mean (Fig. 3A). The observed
time interval is now given by τn = τ1n
b
∏N
j=1 (1 + j). It
then follows that log τn = log τ1 − b log n +
∑
j , since
log (1 + j) ' j if j  1. Hence the progress curve
represents a straight line fit through a maximum like-
lihood approach on a log-log plot, exactly as assumed
by our LOWESS analysis (Fig. 1D–F) where residuals
are Gaussian distributed. The attacks whose
∑
j devi-
ates from zero are likely to have distinctive characteris-
tics. We labeled the attacks where
∑
j is larger than
one standard deviation as Late and the ones where it is
smaller than one negative standard deviation as Early
(Fig. 3A). We found that Early attacks are correlated
with high media activity (Fig. 3B), as expected since
those attacks take place while the news about the previ-
ous one have not fade out. We also observed that Late
attacks are both more deadly (Fig. 3C–D) and result
more frequently in the suicide of the attacker than Early
attacks (Fig. 3E). We identify Late attacks with planned
attacks whose attackers provide a continued leakage of
clues over time [6].
The Red versus Blue model uncovers an unexpect-
ed inter-relationship between the patterns of lone-wolf
school attacks in different geographical locations. If
events in different locations were independent, one would
not expect any relationship between the log τ1 and b in
different locations. However Figure 3F shows that the
opposite is true. The presence of a linear relationship
among these different states, as well as the presence of a
significant kernel function in the Hawkes model, indicates
that there is a common dynamical factor influencing oth-
erwise independent attackers across different states. Our
analysis suggests that the cause of this common dynam-
ical factor lies in modern media sources.
THE COPYCAT EFFECT
Our hypothesis that the interaction between attacks is
indirect through the media is a phenomenon common-
ly known as the copycat effect [26]. This interaction
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FIG. 3. Red vs Blue model: Attack characteristics. (A) Histogram of
∑
j . Early and Late attacks are marked in blue
and orange respectively. (B–E) Attack characteristics for All (Grey), Early (Blue) and Late (Orange) attacks. (B) Number
of tweets preceding the attacks. (C) Average casualty number. (D) Fraction of attacks with victims. (E) Fraction of attack
ending in suicide. (F) Prediction plot, log10 τ1 vs. b. All states with at least three events are considered. States above the
b = 0 line experienced an escalation in the number of attacks. The updated Shultz et al. database (until 2015, where Twitter
data is available) was used for all plots except otherwise noted.
can be attributed to an acute ‘issue-attention cycle’ [27]
with the media reacting strongly to every attack [28].
Although the effect of mass media has been studied, evi-
dence of copycats has been anecdotal [6]. To analyze
the role of social media (which echos and amplifies all
media), we obtained 72 million tweets containing the
word “shooting”. From these, over 1.1 million tweets
contained the word “school”. Figures 4A–B visualizes
the relationship between the number of tweets containing
the words “school” and “shooting” with the Early and
Late attacks. As expected given that a peak in Twitter
activity follows every attack, Early attacks are correlat-
ed with periods of high Twitter activity. To study the
interaction between social media and school shootings,
we plotted the average number of tweets containing the
words “school” and “shooting” against the probability of
an attack in the next 7, 17 and 44 days, corresponding
to percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th of the distribution of
the days between attacks. Fig. 4C shows that the prob-
ability of an attack increases with the number of tweets
talking about school shootings. For example, the prob-
ability of an attack in the next week doubles when the
number of school shooting tweets increases from 10 to
50 tweets/million. By contrast, tweets containing only
“shooting” or “mass” and “murder” did not show a pro-
nounced effect (Fig. S5). Our analysis thus confirms that
social media publicity about school shootings correlates
with an increase in the probability of new attacks.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our treatment goes towards explaining and predicting
the probablistic escalation patterns in school shootings.
Our theory is supported by analysis of an FBI dataset
of active shooting [29] (Figs. S6 and S7, Supplementary
Information), and has implications in attack prevention
and mitigation. First, the discovery of distinct trends
for college and K-12 attacks should motivate policy mak-
ers to focus policy efforts in distinct ways for these two
educational settings. Second, the presence of underly-
ing patterns in the data can improve both short-term
and long-term prediction of future trends, for example by
focusing the efforts in the cities where there has already
been already an attack. Finally, our analysis proves for
the first time the copycat effect in school shootings, a
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FIG. 4. Feedback loop between school shootings and mass media. (A) Time series of the number of tweets containing
“school” and “shooting” (Red lines, left axis), and the severity of attacks (right axis) for Early attacks (Blue), Late attacks
(Orange) and the rest (Grey). (B) Sandy Hook incident. (C) Probability of an attack happening in the 7, 18 or 45 days
following attack n, as a function of the mean number of tweets with the words “school” and “shooting” at days n and n+ 1.
The Shultz database was used for all plots.
topic which has been analyzed primarily in a narrative,
case-by-case way to date. Our results do not contradict
the fact that the psychological aspect of the attacker is a
key factor in an individual attack, or that traditional pre-
vention methods work, but instead draw a new collective
example of human conflict in which a small, dynamical,
violent sector of society confronts the remainder fueled
by Blue’s own informational product (media).
METHODS
METHODS
Databases
We studied the following datasets: Everytown: The
attacks, with and without victims, were extracted from
http://everytown.org/, containing all incidents from
the period January 2013 to November 2014. Shultz: The
database for the period 1990–2013 gathered by Shultz
et al. [30] was updated with the Everytown database to
include recent attacks with victims up to November 2014.
USA Today: The database for the period 2006–July
2015 gathered by http://www.usatoday.com/, includ-
ing all attacks with four or more victims. Active shoot-
ings: The date, size, age of the attacker and suicide
result was obtained from the 2014 FBI report A Study
of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013 [29]. Twitter:
57 billions tweets were analyzed in the period 2010 to
November 2014, extracting over 72 million tweets with
the word “shooting”, 1.1 million with the words “shoot-
ing” and “school”, and 233 thousand with the words
“mass” and “murder”.
Active shootings
We repeated the analysis with the 160 active shoot-
ings events from the FBI database [29]. In this case, the
distribution of attack sizes does not follow a power law
(Fig. S6A). However, this is likely due to the definition
7of active shooting, where attacks with a low number of
casualties do not tend to be included in the study. In
agreement with the results of the report [29], we find
a steady rise in the frequency of attacks (Fig. S6B).
Consistent with our results of school shootings, the time
between the two first attacks is a good indicator of the
subsequent escalation pattern (Fig. S6C). We found an
interaction between attacks (Fig. S6D), which can be
attributed to the copycat effect, since the probability of
an attack in the subsequent 8, 19 and 35 days is corre-
lated with the number of tweets containing “shooting”
(Fig. S6E), or “school” and “shooting” (Fig. S6F), but
not “mass” and “murder” (Fig. S6G). We can define
again Early and Late attacks (Fig. S7A), that correlate
with Twitter activity (Fig. S7B–C). However, the size of
the attacks in this case is not different for Early and Late
attacks (Fig. S7D).
Finally, we analyzed the correlation between age, size,
and suicide rates (Fig. S7E–G). We found a positive
correlation between age and attack size (Fig. S7E).
Teenagers (ages 12–18) correlate with small size events
(Fig. S7E) and low suicide rates (Fig. S7F). Young
attackers (ages 18–38) exhibit high suicide rates (Fig.
S7F). The size of the attack is not well correlated with
suicide rates, with the exception of attacks without vic-
tims (Fig. S7G).
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FIG. S1. (A) Autocorrelation (ACf (n) =
1
N−n
∑N−n−1
t=0 f(t+ n)f(t)) for the interevent time series (f) for the Shultz,
Everytown and USA Today databases at different lags (n). The interevent time series has been normalized by substracting the
mean and dividing by the standard deviation. (B) Attack series using the normalized interevent time. Vertical bars correspond
to individual attacks. (C) Attack series by state in the Shultz dataset. (D) Attack series in the 8 towns with two or more
attacks in the Everytown dataset.
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FIG. S2. The progress plot log10 n vs. log10 τn, using all attacks ([0− n]), attacks [1− n], [3− n] and [10− n] in the Shultz
database.
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FIG. S3. Kernel function of the Hawkes process by magnitude of attack. Intensity of attacks with respect to (left) distance
between attacks and (right) time between attacks.
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FIG. S4. (A) Fraction of attacks within a distance of each other, two null models where the attacks are drawn with probabily
equal to the underlying US population and at times equal to the Schulz database (null model Shultz) or with frequency following
a Poisson process (null model Poisson), and another null model where the attacks are drawn from the US area at random and
at times equal to the Schulz database. (B) Intensity of attacks with respect to distance between attacks. (C) Intensity of
attacks with respect to time between attacks.
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FIG. S5. Probability of an attack happening in the 7, 18, or 45 days following attack n, as a function of the mean number of
tweets with the words (A) “mass” and “murder” and (B) “shooting” at days n and n+ 1. The Shultz database was used for
all plots.
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FIG. S6. Active shooting a (A) Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) for event severity (blue dots
and solid line) and best fit (dashed line) to lognormal distribution. (B) The progress curve, log10 n vs. log10 τn, for all attacks.
LOWESS fit (δ = 0, α = 0.66) is shown in dark gray, with the years where the trend changes annotated. (C) Prediction plot,
log10 τ1 vs. b. All states with more than four events are considered. States above the b = 0 line experienced an escalation in
the number of attacks. (D) Probability of attack depending on the presence of an attack in the previous seven days. Every bin
contains one third of the attacks. (E–G) Probability of an attack happening in the 8, 19 or 35 days following to attack n, as a
function of the mean number of tweets talking about shootings at days n and n+ 1.
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FIG. S7. Active shooting b (A) Histogram showing
∑
j . Early and Late attacks are marked in blue and orange, respectively.
(B) Time Series of the number of tweets containing “mass” and “shooting” or “murder” (Red lines, left axis), and the size of
attacks (right axis) for Early attacks (Blue), Late attacks (Orange) and the rest (Grey). (C) Median number of tweets in the
five days preceding All (Grey), Early (Blue) and Late (Orange) attacks. (D) Average casualty number for All (Grey), Early
(Blue) and Late (Orange) attacks. (E) Probability of different magnitude of events by age group. (F) Probability of suicide by
age group. (G) Probability of suicide by size of attack group.
